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Abstract  
Ecological disorganization stemming from conspicuous consumption practices is 
understudied in the social sciences. In this analysis, we study conspicuous consumption and 
its implications for environmental sociology, ecological footprint analysis, and green 
criminology. We examine the issue of conspicuous consumption through the study of items 
that increase the ecological footprint considerably, that is, through the consumption of 
“luxury commodities.” Specifically, we draw attention to assessing aspects of ecological 
footprints of super yachts, super homes, luxury vehicles, and private jets. Taken together, the 
construction and use of these items in the United States alone is likely to create a CO2 
footprint that exceeds those from entire nations. These results are not necessarily surprising 
but suggest that excessive consumption practices of the wealthy may need to be reinterpreted 
as criminal when they disrupt the normal regeneration and reproduction of ecosystems by 
generating excessive ecological disorganization.  
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Introduction 
In How the Rich are Destroying the Earth, Herve Kempf suggests that a portion of the 
current ecological crisis stems from excessive consumption by the rich (see also Bollier 2013; 
Di Muzio 2015). Reinforcing that point, studying household incomes, and carbon footprints, 
Kennedy, Krahn, and Krogman (2014) refer to the wealthiest income group (quintile) as 
“egregious emitters” due to their much higher level of consumption. As Rees and Westra 
(2003) note, “Since the wealthy fifth or so of humanity consumes 80+ per cent [sic] of global 
economic output, the rich alone effectively ‘appropriate’ the entire capacity of Earth in 
important dimensions” (p. 112). In contrast to these arguments, business and economics 
researchers often describe luxury item consumption as ecologically sustainable because 
luxury commodities last longer (Amatulli et al. 2017). 
It is widely accepted across nations that one perk of being wealthy is to consume as one 
pleases. Such pleasures can promote excessive consumption which uses up natural resources, 
causing ecological disorganization—disruptions in the normal functioning of the ecosystem 
in ways that prohibit its regeneration/ reproduction, causing increasing ecosystem instability 
(Lynch et al. 2016, chp. 3; Schnaiberg 1980; Stretesky, Long, and Lynch 2013b). Under the 
influence of contemporary post–WWII capitalism, new wants were stimulated to enhance 
profit making, increasing a new form of excessive consumption Migone (2007) calls 
“hedonistic consumption.” Kempf suggests that excessive consumption by the wealthy has 
relatively old roots, best described by Thorsten Veblen’s ([1899] 1934) theory of conspicuous 
consumption. In Veblen’s view, the wealthy purposefully consume luxury items publicly and 
to excess to elevate or maintain their social status (for a validating empirical test see Heffetz 
2011). Kempf, in turn, argues that modern conspicuous consumption by the wealthy 
generates extensive ecological harms and that the wealthy generate disproportionately more 
ecological harm than the poor or middle classes.  
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Other views support this contention at different scales of analysis. This idea is also 
expressed in aggregate patterns of ecological consumption across nations measured using 
ecological footprints (Jorgenson 2003, 2012; Jorgenson and Clark 2011; Knight, Schor, and 
Jorgenson 2017; York, Rosa, and Dietz 2003). For example, controlling for trade relations 
between nations, footprint analysis indicates an association between cross-national ecological 
consumption and national income levels, meaning citizens consume more in wealthier 
nations (Prell 2016; Prell and Sun 2015; Weinzettel et al. 2013). Such analyses indicate that 
wealthier (also called “advanced” or “developed”) economies have much larger ecological 
footprints than less-developed nations. In advanced economies, there is a greater tendency for 
consumption in general, and perhaps some tendency for all classes to mimic the conspicuous 
consumption habits of the wealthy (Podoshen and Andrzejewski 2012). Across nations, these 
consumption patterns can be understood relative to the global capitalist economy in relation 
to theories such as metabolic rift (Foster 2011; Foster, Clark, and York 2011). In metabolic 
rift terms, excessive consumption in developed nations is fed by ecological withdrawals from 
less-developed nations, and transferring metabolic materials and natural wealth from less 
developed to developed nations is part of the nature of global capitalism and the process of 
ecological unequal exchange (Jorgenson 2006).  
In criminology, excessive consumption has been connected to the production of 
ecological disorganization and viewed as a green crime against nature (Lynch et al. 2013). 
Here, we argue that the wealthy’s excessive or conspicuous consumption should be 
conceptualized as a form of green crime within the contemporary context of global ecological 
collapse (Barnosky et al. 2012; Barry 2014) that generates: unnecessary ecological 
disorganization and consumption inequities, a decline in global ecological quality, uneven 
ecological access and destruction, and unequal exposure to environmental hazards across 
nations.  
 5 
Here, we examine four indicators of conspicuous consumption’s ecological impacts to 
illustrate the above. Where possible, we compare those outcomes to average consumption to 
better gauge the impact of conspicuous consumption on ecological disorganization. When 
such comparisons cannot be made, we refer to the “gross harm” associated with conspicuous 
consumption. Our four examples include the ecological impacts of (1) operating super yachts 
(SYs); (2) building super homes (SHs) (those greater than 25,000 square feet); (3) operating 
luxury cars (costing more than $42,000) in the United States; and (4) for individual and 
corporate operation of private jets.  
Background  
Currently, many nations have excessive ecological footprints and increased levels of 
ecological destruction (Foster et al. 2011). By “excessive,” we mean an unsustainable 
ecological footprint.  
Empirically, ecological footprints measure biocapacity availability against 
consumption/ecological withdrawals, with ecological footprints less than 1.0 defined as 
sustainable and those greater than 1.0 as unsustainable. The current global ecological 
footprint is 1.7, indicating excessive consumption relative to available and replaceable 
biocapacity (http://www.footprintnetwork.org/).  
Research indicates that controlling for trade relationship effects, a nation’s ecological 
footprint varies with income, so that higher income nations tend to have larger ecological 
footprints (Ivanova et al. 2015; Weinzettel et al. 2013). For some high consuming nations, 
where footprints are greater than 1.0, consumption is augmented by consuming available 
biocapacity in other nations as part of the global structure of capitalism (Foster et al. 2011). 
In this sense, excessive consumption within some nations is facilitated by the global capitalist 
world system, which enhances the transfer of raw materials from less-developed nations to 
more-developed nations as part of ecological unequal exchange (Jorgenson 2006). The 
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organization of this system contributes to global and local ecological decline and 
disorganization. As Schor (2005) argues, it is now widely known that current consumption 
patterns fostered by the falling prices of goods in the global capitalist market place due to 
increased capital mobility are ecologically unsustainable (see also Alcott 2008). Coupled 
with changing and more positive attitudes toward conspicuous consumption among 
populations, such as those in China where there is now a growing class of wealthy consumers 
(Podoshen, Li, and Zhang 2011), local and global world capitalist markets are accelerating 
resource consumption with potentially disastrous ecological consequences.  
Ecological footprint analysis demonstrates variability in consumption behaviors and 
ecological impacts across nations and that “developed” or “advanced” nations have higher 
ecological footprints than less-developed nations (Jorgenson 2003; Jorgenson, Schor, Huang, 
and Fitzgerald 2016; Jorgenson, Schor, Knight, and Huang 2016; Wiedenhofer et al. 2017). 
Within and across developed nations, Kempf argued that the wealthy’s consumption habits 
cause excessive ecological harm compared to the behavior of individuals in other income 
classes (see also Feng, Zou, and Wei 2011; Yang, Wu, and Cheung 2016). Consistent with 
that argument, Oxfam International (2015) notes that while the poorest half of the world’s 
(3.5 billion people) population generates 10 percent of carbon emissions, the richest 10 
percent produce nearly one-half of carbon dioxide emissions.  
As noted above, prior literature (e.g., Kempf 2008) argued that the wealthy have an 
excessive ecological footprint and make unequal ecological contributions to carbon footprints 
(Kennedy et al. 2014) and ecosystem resource consumption (Rees and Westra 2003). In this 
sense, excessive consumption can be linked to Veblen’s ([1899] 1934) concept of 
conspicuous consumption. After noting the origins of leisure, Veblen argued that the 
historical process of capital accumulation concentrated capital in ways that allowed the 
emergence of a new leisure class.  
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The leisure class engaged in visible forms of excessive consumption as a 
customary basis of repute and esteem . . . [P]roperty now becomes the most easily 
recognised evidence of a reputable degree of success . . . [and] the conventional 
basis of esteem. Its possession in some amount becomes necessary. . .to any 
reputable standing in the community. It becomes indispensable to accumulate, to 
acquire property, in order to retain one’s good name. (Veblen [1899] 1934: 15)  
Here, acquiring property and consuming excessively become marks of distinction, and 
to earn those marks, the leisure class must consume. When connected to contemporary 
arguments in ecological Marxism concerning the contradictions between capitalism and 
nature (Foster 1999, 2000), one can argue that excessive consumption must result in 
excessive ecological disorganization or the excessive consumption of nature. This latter 
argument is empirically testable, and the association between various measures of ecological 
consumption and environmental degradation has been subjected to several empirical tests 
(Givens and Jorgenson 2011; Jorgenson 2003, 2006; Jorgenson and Clark 2011).  
Criminologically speaking, excessive consumption is relevant to defining and 
understanding concepts such as green crime and green justice. In green criminology, 
excessive consumption generates what treadmill of production theory describes as ecological 
disorganization or an accelerating pace of consumption that disrupts the normal functioning 
of the ecosystem that prohibits its regeneration and reproduction (Schnaiberg 1980). Green 
criminology emerged in 1990 as an extension of Marxist/radical criminology (Lynch 1990; 
on radical criminology see Lynch and Michalowski 2006) and was introduced to create a 
political economic understanding of how environmental harms that affected ecosystems and 
ecosystem inhabitants (including human and nonhuman life) and the production of ecological 
and environmental injustice. The green criminological literature is diverse, addressing, 
among other issues: (1) theoretical and empirical research grounded in political economic and 
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treadmill of production theory (Long, Lynch, and Stretesky 2018; Long et al. 2012; Lynch et 
al. 2013; Stretesky, Long, and Lynch 2013a; Stretesky et al. 2013b; Stretesky and Lynch 
2011; Stretesky et al. 2017; Stretesky et al. 2018); (2) theory and research about harms 
against nonhuman animals, and controlling those harms (Beirne 1999; (Nurse 2015; Sollund 
2011); (3) discussions of biopiracy, food exploitation, and hunger (South 2007; Walters 2006, 
2007); (4) green-cultural criminology, which examines “mediated depictions” of ecological 
harm (Brisman and South 2013); (5) empirical studies of environmental injustice (Lynch, 
Stretesky, and Burns 2004; Stretesky and Lynch 1998, 2002) and carbon emissions (Stretesky 
and Lynch 2009) as examples of green crimes; (6) studies of compliance with environmental 
regulations (Barrett et al. 2018; Kahler and Gore 2012); and (7) research on conservation 
criminology (Gibbs et al. 2009; Gore 2011), which promotes risk assessment studies of 
conservation crimes (Gibbs et al. 2011), empirical studies of opportunity structures affecting 
green crimes, and the control of conservation crimes (Petrossian 2015; Petrossian, Rolf, and 
Clarke 2016; Pires and Clarke 2012).  
Drawing on various theoretical perspectives such as treadmill of production, world 
systems theory, and ecological unequal exchange, green criminologists have posited that the 
adverse outcomes associated with ecological disorganization are tied to the expansionary 
tendencies of the capitalist world system (Lynch et al. 2013). Here, ecological 
disorganization is the sum of the deleterious effects of two connected economic-ecological 
processes: ecological withdrawals that disrupt ecosystems by removing resources from the 
environment and ecological additions that disrupt ecosystems by adding pollution to 
environments (Schnaiberg 1980). In an effort to promote growth and capital accumulation, in 
addition to exploiting labor, capitalist must expand the market, which means producing more 
goods and more demand for those goods. To increase production, capitalism must increase 
withdrawals of ecological resources, causing ecosystem damage or disorganization. Those 
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raw materials are then fed into the manufacturing process where, applying fossil fuel and 
chemical energy, other forms of ecological disorganization are created: pollution or 
ecological additions. Drawing on these insights and from ecological Marxism (Foster 1992, 
1997, 2000), green criminologists suggested that the ordinary production of commodities via 
the capitalist process, creates ecological disorganization and can be conceptualized as a form 
of green crime from the perspective of nature and also as a form of green/ecological injustice 
(Lynch et al. 2013).  
The view above suggests that the problem of ecological disorganization/destruction and 
injustice is structural; and that its primary cause is found in the organization and operation of 
the global capitalist economy (as well as within the organization and structure of “local” or 
national capitalism), which drives expanding ecological withdrawals of resources, increasing 
levels of ecological additions (i.e., pollution) and accelerating consumption to persistently 
increase profit making—the ultimate goal of capitalism. It is well known that these features 
of capitalism show up not only in other structural phenomenon (i.e., class struggle; unequal 
ownership of production; unequal wage structures; class, race, and gender discrimination; 
unequal distribution of wealth and income; a diminishing social safety net, and so on, (Foster 
1992, 1997, 2000) but also at lower levels of aggregation, and empirically, this must occur 
for structural inequality to be present. With regard to this structural argument and following 
Kempf, it is possible to examine how structural inequities play out at lower levels of 
aggregation.  
Below, we employ examples of how excessive consumption by the wealthy increases 
their ecological footprint, impacts ecological stability (Davison 2016), and contributes to 
behaviors stimulated by capitalism both ideologically (consumption-based stimulus that can 
be addressed, for example, by green-cultural criminology (Brisman and South 2013, 2014)) 
and structurally. That kind of empirical evidence contributes to political economic green 
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criminological and green-cultural criminological explanations of green crimes and injustice 
(Lynch and Stretesky 2014).  
In contrast to views described previously, some marketing researchers argue that luxury 
brand consumption by the wealthy is “inherently” sustainable (Amatulli et al. 2017:97). 
Marketing researchers argue that luxury commodities are “inherently” sustainable because 
they last forever (e.g., diamonds), and that the longevity of these items reduces their 
ecological footprints. These are dubious assertions. For example, consider the ecological 
costs of serving short-lived commodities with extensive ecological effects. Serendipity 3, a 
New York restaurant, at one time served a dessert that Guinness’ Book of World’s Records 
identified as the world’s most expensive dessert: Frrrozened Haute Chocolate ice cream 
sundae. The dessert’s price, US$25,000, was due to the inclusion of 28 different forms of 
cocoa, five grams of edible gold foil, and the take home serving container that included an 
18-carat gold, diamond encrusted bracelet and serving spoon. One hardly needs to argue 
about the known deleterious ecological harms associated with cocoa farming (Noble 2017); 
let alone gold mining, even at the “artisanal” level (Pavilonis et al. 2017), or diamond 
mining—which may involve “conflict diamonds,” unequal core-peripheral exchanges in the 
diamond commodity chain and issues of ethical consumption (Le Billon 2008). Other 
extreme luxury items which challenge the narrative of sustainable, low-ecological impact 
luxury consumption include: Vizoury’s “Pure White” luxury dumbbell, coated in ruthenium, 
750 flawless white diamonds (7.5 carats), and a custom made walnut storage box (29,000 
Euros); or Gout de Diamants champagne, with a hand-crafted solid white-gold label 
containing 18 carats of diamonds (US$1.8 million). A list of other such items can be found 
on the Bornrich.com web site.  
While it is possible to explore numerous examples of ecological harms generated by 
individual luxury products, ecological harms are more visible in larger aggregates of luxury 
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consumables. By examining these larger aggregates, a picture of the ecological footprint of 
luxury consumption in comparison to “average” or similar kinds of consumables in a 
category can also be undertaken. To do so, we examine four examples of how the wealthy’s 
consumption of luxury items generates excessive ecological disorganization: the operation of 
Sys; the building of SHs; the operation of luxury vehicles; and the operation of private jet 
aircraft. These categories were selected because they can be aggregated, and, as noted below, 
these impacts can be described in ecologically relevant terms such as carbon equivalent 
impacts.  
Conspicuous Consumption, Ecological Disorganization, and Sys  
There is little need to argue that only the wealthiest people can purchase and operate 
Sys. An average SY costs $3 million a year in fuel, maintenance, docking, and staffing 
(Mathew2015).TheinitialSYbuy-independs on its size. For larger SY, the buy-in averages 
$275 million, with an upper price near US$1 billion (see below). For smaller, less 
wellequipped SY, prices range from $12 to $50 million. Gadd (2015) estimates there are only 
about 200,000 individuals in the world (0.0027 percent of the global population) with 
sufficient accumulated assets—which he defined as more than $30 million—to afford even 
the smallest SY.  
The term SY emerged in the early 1900s to refer to the increasingly large boats private 
individuals were building as their wealth increased. This is an example of the kind of 
conspicuous consumption to which Veblen drew attention at the end of the nineteenth 
century. Sys are yachts larger than 24 meters/79 feet in length, and can, on average, range up 
to 70 meters/230 feet. The largest SY—those over 300 feet—are also referred to as 
megayachts or giga-yachts. Some SY are over 500 feet in length, such as the Fulk al Salamah 
(164 m/538 feet) and the Azzam (180 m/590 feet).  
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As of 2012, there were an estimated 32 mega/giga yachts in the world. Globally, there 
are 100 Sys larger than 230 feet and 300 Sys larger than 60 meters/196.9 feet (this 
information is updated live, http://www.superyachts. Com/largest-yachts/worlds-largest-
yachts-live. Htm). Despite the small size of the SY fleet, it has extensive ecological 
consequences. At the microlevel, an example of this harm was widely reported in January 
2016 when one of the Sys owned by Microsoft’s cofounder, Paul Allen, crashed into a 
protected coral reef, damaging up to 14,000 square feet or 80 percent of the reef.  
On a larger scale, it is difficult to estimate the full extent of the ecological costs of 
building and operating Sys. It is unclear, for example, how much steel, 12luminium or other 
metals, fiberglass, exotic materials and so forth, are involved in building an SY, and clearly, 
the quantities vary depending on an SY’s size and amenities, which can be extensive. Some 
Sys include “extras” such as helicopters, submarines, and smaller boats; and the volume of 
waste generated by operating Sys (e.g., food, paper, and fecal waste) are unknown. These 
“extras,” along with size, can make Sys not only financially pricey, but also costly 
environmentally. Reportedly, the world’s most expensive SY, the Eclipse, cost between 
US$800 million to US$1.5 billion. At 162.5 meters/533 feet, it is also the world’s second 
largest SY and contains 6,000 square feet of living space in 18 guest cabins. In addition, the 
master suite is 5,000 square feet and with 11,000 square feet of floating living space, the 
Eclipse is five times the size of an average U.S. home. It is operated by a 92-person crew, and 
the crew requires living space not accounted for above. In short, it should be clear that Sys 
are owned by the very wealthy, and therefore, any ecological harm generated from building 
and operating Sys stems from the conspicuous consumption behaviors of the wealthy.  
In our effort to quantify Sys’ ecological impacts, we admit omitting their full ecological 
impacts and costs. For example, we were unable to estimate the volume of various materials 
(e.g., rare woods and metals) and the quantity of energy used to construct Sys. Our estimate 
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focuses only on the carbon footprint of Sys in use and, as a result, drastically underestimates 
the full scope of the ecological disorganization generated by building Sys. Likewise, our 
comparisons are based on employing U.S. commodities, and the ecological effect difference 
may be greater or less on the nation used for comparative purposes.  
Operating an SY is expensive and ecologically damaging. On average, an SY over 71 
meters/233 feet uses 500 liters/132 gallons of gasoline an hour, and annual fuel costs for an 
average SY are around $400,000. From available data, we estimated that an average (71 
meter) SY uses about 107,000 gallons gasoline/year and produces 2.1 million pounds of 
carbon dioxide emissions annually. Thus, the fleet of 300 SY produces approximately 627 
million pounds of carbon dioxide emissions a year. That very large figure needs to be placed 
in context. To do so, we compare the carbon and gasoline footprint of Sys owned by the 
wealthy to the average vehicle—a more affordable mode of transportation for the average 
person operated in the United States.  
An average new car gets 25.5 miles per gallon (mpg) in the United States. According to 
the U.S. Department of Transportation (U.S. DOT) (https://www.fueleconomy.gov), an 
average person drives about 13,476 miles, using 528.5 gallons of gas, and generates 10,358.6 
pounds of CO2 pollution annually. Thus, one average SY produces as much CO2 pollution as 
202 average cars, and, annually, the SY fleet (N = 300) uses as much gasoline as 60,600 cars 
that get 25.5 mpg.  
Another way to illustrate the annual ecological harm caused by SY is to compare the 
CO2 emissions from the 300 largest SY to the CO2 emissions of entire nations. The SY fleet 
carbon emissions (nearly 630 million pounds), for example, is similar to the emissions of the 
10.6 million inhabitants of Burundi (654.02 million pounds), and 5.7 times larger than the 
carbon footprint (111,556,039 pounds) of the small (36,157 inhabitants) developed nation of 
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Liechtenstein. Thus, the carbon footprint of the global SY fleet of the wealthy produces as 
much ecological disorganization as entire nations of people.  
Ecological Housing Footprint of SHs  
The wealthy often own multiple homes. Their primary homes can be extremely large 
and their home-related ecological footprint may extend beyond their primary home. Here, we 
focus attention only on the largest homes of the wealthy in the United States, whether they 
are primary or secondary homes. To do so, we collected data on the largest homes for sale in 
the United States in November 2016. Similar to large Sys, we refer to these homes as “super 
homes”.  
Before beginning, we note that our analysis underestimates the ecological effect of 
building SHs since we can only estimate their ecological effects from general home 
construction guidelines. Moreover, we could not quantify the effects of using luxury or exotic 
construction materials (i.e., rare wood or stone). We restricted our analysis to free-standing 
homes (i.e., excluded apartments and condominiums). In addition, since our data are drawn 
from the United States, the results may not generalize to other nations.  
It is difficult to compare average SHs to average homes. According to the U.S. 
Department of Commerce, the average size of new homes varies over time and has tended to 
increase since the early 1970s (Perry 2015; U.S. Department of Commerce 2015). 
Nevertheless, average new home data provide a rough estimate of the difference in size and 
the ecological footprint of average U.S. homes and SHs. 
-Table 1 About Here- 
The price of SHs in our data varied considerably, from $3 to 5 million to more than 
$100 million dollars. Table 1 shows information for 39 SH for sale in the United States 
during the six-month period from April, 2016, through November, 2016. Data shown in this 
table were extracted from and cross-referenced with several real estate web sites (e.g., Zillow 
 15 
and Trulia) to obtain additional home characteristics. As Table 1 indicates, these homes had: 
(1) a mean price of $27.76 million; (2) total mean square feet of 39,798 (35,300 in main 
building, plus 4,498 square feet in additional buildings); and (3) total building square footage 
(other buildings on the property, including garages when not included in the listing) of 
1,552,107. In contrast, during the same time period, an average U.S. home: (1) cost $188,000 
(147 times less); (2) contained about 2,200 square feet (SHs were about 18 times larger); and 
(3) included about 576 square feet of garage space.  
To compare the ecological costs of these different categories of homes, we calculated 
(1) the approximate square feet of wood used to build each type; (2) estimated the number of 
trees required to build the average home in each group; and (3) translated trees used into 
carbon footprints. These estimates may not represent the true ecological effect of SHs 
because SHs likely include additional/larger wood trims (e.g., wood cabinetry, base-board 
moldings, chair rails, corner blocks, and ceiling moldings), and other wood finishes (i.e., 
solid woods) compared to average homes, and we did not adjust for those potential 
differences, which cannot be measured without more specific information on each SH in the 
sample. Thus, we likely underestimate the ecological disorganization effect of SHs.  
Calculating the carbon-related ecological footprint of a home is difficult and requires 
several transformations described in brief below. For example, the Idaho Forest Products 
Commission’s web site indicates that an average home includes 12.5 board feet of wood 
products per square foot for nonconcrete slab houses. A board foot is a board one inch × 12 
inches × 12 inches. Our estimate is based on an average house, and not on estimates of board 
feet in new constructions alone, which over time declined (see Lutz 2016 for trends). As a 
result, our estimate, because it includes older homes in the average, yields a higher board foot 
estimate.  
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Following the above, an average American home contains about 27,500 board feet. To 
simplify our comparison, we assumed that SHs use the same square foot ratio of wood 
products as an average home. This assumption likely underestimates the board feet in SHs 
because SH likely include more wood in their construction (e.g., additional wood trims) than 
an average home. SH also includes other omitted ecological effects from the use of rare 
woods, old growth forest woods, and so on, that have not been taken into account. 
Nevertheless, we estimated that an average SH used 497,475 board feet of wood product or 
18.09 times as much wood product as an average U.S. home.  
Next, we translated board feet into tree equivalents using the “Doyle Rule” for 
determining board feet from a tree (see, Guldin and Baker 1988). From the Doyle Table, we 
selected a relatively large tree (48 foot tall, 36 inch diameter) for the board feet 
transformation. It is likely, however, that average homes and SH use different wood stocks 
and have different wood stock ecological effects (e.g., some trees grow faster), but we were 
unable to address those effects. From the Doyle table, each tree we selected produces 1,310 
board feet. Thus, a 2,200 square foot/27,700 board foot home uses 20 trees, while an average 
SH (497,475 board feet) consumes 380 trees, or has a tree-related ecological withdrawal 
effect about 19 times higher (without accounting for additional wood-use differences).  
Tree harvesting can also impact wildlife population stability, which is an additional 
ecological cost of home building. We calculated that effect using federal data relating 
wildlife population stability relative to forest density. Following U.S. Federal guidelines, 
forest density of 300 trees per acre is suitable for wildlife population stability (U.S. 
Department of Agriculture 2015). Using this estimate and our tree use estimates above, an 
average home consumes seven percent of a well-forested area, whereas an SH consumes 127 
percent of a well-forested area. Translated into other measures, this means that five 
wellforested acres could produce wood for 71.43 average homes, but for only four SHs.  
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An alternative measure of environmental harm from home building can be derived by 
estimating the carbon sequestration potential lost to trees harvested for home building—a 
measure which also illustrates the connection between ecological withdrawals, ecological 
disorganization, carbon pollution, and climate change. Doing so requires a series of estimates 
to translate trees used into carbon sequestration equivalents. For our example, we used trees 
described earlier (48 feet in height; 36 inch diameter; 72 inch circumference). Tree 
circumference can be used to estimate tree age, and tree age is then used to calculate carbon 
sequestration.  
The simplest tree age estimation suggests that each inch in circumference is equivalent 
to one year’s growth (for more complex tree growth and species-specific models see Colbert 
et al. 2004). As our examples trees have a 72 inch circumference, they would be 
approximately 72 years old. Scientific studies indicate that an average tree sequesters about 
48 pounds of carbon dioxide annually, and that large trees have an average life span of 150 
years (Nowak and Crane 2000). In our example, then, harvested trees have 78 years of life 
remaining at time of harvest. Over those 78 now lost years, an average tree could potentially 
sequester 3,744 pounds of CO2 (78 × 48 pds/year).  
Using our sample trees, an average home requires harvesting 20 trees and an SH 
requires 380 trees. Carbon sequestration loss for an average home is, therefore, 74,880 
pounds CO2, while it is 1,422,720 for an SH—or nearly 20 times greater for an SH.  
The 39 SH homes in Table 1 generate a carbon sequestration loss of 55,486,080 
pounds, which is the equivalent loss associated with building 741 average homes. Again, this 
procedure may underestimates the carbon sequestration effect of building SHs because they 
are likely to contain more wood products than we use in our estimates.  
Luxury Car versus BestSelling Car Footprints  
 18 
The wealthy also have adverse ecological impacts through their automobile purchasing 
and operating habits. The wealthy possess the ability to purchase vehicles (i.e., luxury 
vehicles) largely unavailable to the average consumer. While the definition of a luxury 
vehicle is debatable (Flint 2009), those vehicles typically cost “much more” than the average 
vehicle and have features “beyond what is necessary.” For our analysis, we only employ data 
on new car sales from 2015 (mean car price in 2015 was $35,543). Price data were extracted 
from Kelley Blue Book (KBB; https://mediaroom.kbb.com/new-cartransaction-prices-jump-
august-2015). In 2015, KBB indicated an average compact car sold for $20,560, while the 
entry level price for the luxury car market began at $ 42,383. Based on these data, we 
employed a cutoff of $42,000 to identify luxury cars sold in the United States in 2015. Those 
data, which appear in Table 2, were aggregated depending on the available data (e.g., by 
maker, or by maker and model), and include the sale of hybrid vehicles. 
-Table 2 About Here- 
As with SHs, luxury vehicles have multiple ecological effects, some of which cannot be 
directly measured. First, these vehicles tend to be larger and building them consumes more 
ecological resources. Second, luxury vehicles use materials not found in average cars, and 
thus have different ecological impacts than an average car (e.g., they may include wood 
trim). And third, luxury cars, with the exception of hybrids and electric vehicles, tend to 
perform less efficiently, consume more gasoline, and have a larger carbon dioxide use 
footprint. Of these ecological effects, the CO2 footprint can be measured.  
To create a comparative CO2 use footprint, we collected miles per gallon (MPG) data 
for all luxury cars sold in the United States, and a sample of the best-selling (i.e., average) 
cars in the United States. Car sales data were collected from the web site Left-Lane.com. 
MPG data were derived from the U.S. government web site, www.fueleconomy.gov.  
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Luxury sales and MPG data were collected for 39 luxury models or brands for vehicles 
costing most than $42,000. For some luxury brands, individual vehicle sales were small and 
were thus averaged to create a brand average rather than a model listing. The total number of 
luxury vehicles sold in the United States in 2015 was 708,909. The sales and MPG data for 
each model/brand were used to calculate a weighted MPG effect for each model/brand, and 
then the weighted effects were summed to create an average MPG for all luxury vehicles sold 
in 2015 (see Table 2). As shown in Table 2, the average MPG of the entire luxury fleet (all 
708,909 luxury cars sold) was 19.59 mpg. In Table 2, the relative MPG effect for each 
model/brand is created by multiplying the percent of sales for each model/brand of luxury 
cars sold by each model/ brand’s average MPG. The sum of each model/ brand relative MPG 
is the average MPG of all vehicles in the luxury class sample.  
The same procedure was followed for top 10 vehicles sold (N =2,324,510). Each top 10 
model’s MPG was then derived from the fueleconomy.gov web site. The weighted MPG 
effect for these vehicles (31.28) was derived using the same procedure outlined above (see 
Table 3 for results for top 10 vehicles). The sum of the weighted MPG score equals the 
average MPG for the entire fleet of top 10 vehicles sold. 
-Table 3 About Here- 
From these data (Tables 2 and 3), it is clear that an average luxury vehicle’s MPG 
(19.59) is significantly less efficient than an average top 10 selling model’s MPG (31.28). In 
relative terms, top 10 vehicles sold were 62.63 percent more fuel efficient than luxury 
vehicles. From the MPG data, we can crudely estimate the CO2-use effect in several ways.  
First, for luxury vehicles, we estimated that for every 1,000 miles driven, 51.05 gallons 
of gasoline are required. The U.S. Energy Information Administration 
(https://www.eia.gov/environment/emissions/ co2_vol_mass.php) estimates that one gallon of 
consumed gasoline generates about 19.6 pounds of carbon dioxide. Thus, 51.05 gallons of 
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gasoline consumption translate into 1,000.58 pounds of CO2 emissions per every 1,000 miles 
driven in a luxury car. For 708,909 luxury vehicles driven 1,000 miles each, this equates to 
1,000,580 pounds of CO2 emissions. For the top 10 selling vehicles, gasoline consumption 
per 1,000 miles driven is 31.97, which translates into a CO2 output of 626.60 pounds/1,000 
miles. Compared to top 10 selling vehicles, a luxury vehicle produces, on average, 373.98 
more pounds of CO2 emissions per 1,000 miles traveled, or 59.68 percent more CO2 
emissions.  
The CO2 difference noted above, however, is misleading. Miles driven annually varies 
by income, and thus some effort must be made to address that difference since income and 
luxury vehicle purchases are likely connected. Adjusting for this effect helps derive a better 
measure of the ecological effect of driving luxury vehicles.  
Income-related miles driven can be estimated from U.S. DOT (2011) data. U.S. DOT 
data do not report miles driven by income directly, however, but instead provides data on the 
number of trips (i.e., defined as travel from one address to another in a motor vehicle) by 
income, and average trip length in miles by income. These data can be combined to estimate 
miles traveled annually by income groupings. In 2009, the average number of trips across all 
income groups was 2,640, but for high-income groups (incomes greater than $80,000) 
equaled 4,815 or was 82 percent higher than the average.  
Moreover, trip length also varies by income, and it has been reported that automobile 
travel is shaped by class membership/income (Kotval-K and Vojnovic 2016). For lowincome 
users, average trip length is 8.85 miles. So, for this group, average trip length (8.85 miles) 
times the average number of trips (2,640) equals average miles driven per year = 23,364. For 
the high-income group, average trip length (11.5 miles) times 4,815 trips = 55,373 miles 
annually. These outcomes can then be converted in CO2 outputs per vehicle, which would be 
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55,404 pounds for one vehicle in the high-income group and 17,958 pounds for one vehicle 
in the low-income group.  
Private Luxury Jets Footprints  
The average individual does not own or operate a private luxury jet. That privilege and 
the ecological destruction that goes along with it belongs only to the wealthiest individuals 
and businesses/corporations that employ private jet services. As an example, Donald Trump 
owns a Boeing 757 (U.S. registration number N757AF). Today, there are more than 14,939 
private jets registered in the United States alone (https://registry.faa.gov/aircraftinquiry/). 
Private jets can cost thousands of dollars to operate and rent per hour and have extensive 
ecological costs related to the burning of gasoline and CO2 emissions.  
To estimate those effects, we used data on the most popular private jets. Those data 
were drawn from a Forbes Magazine (Ewalt 2013) article that identified the 12 most popular 
private jets used in the United States. Data on gasoline consumption per hour, variable 
operating costs (fuel, maintenance, parts, and labor), and average rental costs were collected 
for these private jets from the web site Jetadvisors.com (2016). These data are displayed in 
Table 4. 
-Table 4 About Here- 
Data on the number of hours of operation for each plane model found over a one-year 
period are unavailable. Thus, to estimate the annual ecological footprint of operating private 
jets, we used the average hourly fuel consumption by model (see Table 4) along with 
National Business Aviation Association (2015) estimates of the number of hours flown by 
individuals, businesses, corporations and for instructional purposes in private jets. Those data 
indicate the following use patterns: individuals, 8,000,000 hours; business, 2,400,000 hours; 
corporate, 2,700,000 hours; and instructional, 3,900,000 hours; total hours, 17 million. From 
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Table 4, mean hourly fuel consumption for the 12 listed private jet models can be estimated 
and is equal to 344.17 gallons/hour.  
The average volume of CO2 produced from burning one gallon of jet fuel is 21.1 
pounds (https://www.eia.gov/environment/emissions/ co2_vol_mass.php). Thus, from 2014 
data, we estimate the carbon footprint from private plane use (17 million hours; 344.16 
gallons fuel/hour; 21.1 pounds CO2 /hour) to be 55.996 million metric tons annually. Based 
on U.S. Energy Information Administration total U.S. CO2 emissions, private jets generate 
only about one percent of total U.S. carbon emissions. Nevertheless, despite the small 
percentage of total U.S. carbon emissions generated by private planes, the aggregate 
emissions are substantial. Earlier, for example, we noted that Burundi’s 10.6 million residents 
generate about 650 million pounds or 294,835 metric tons of CO2, which is about 45 percent 
of the CO2 produced by the operation of private jets in the United States. This comparison is 
notable in the context of the present discussion to the extent that it illustrates how wealth 
translates into expanded consumption and additional adverse ecological consequences.  
Discussion and Conclusion  
This article examined the effect of the wealthy on ecological disorganization using 
estimates of their ecological footprint related to the conspicuous consumption of particular 
luxury items. Prior studies suggest that income and ecological destruction are positively 
related (Brounen, Kok, and Quigley 2012; Kempf 2008). Within the context of green 
criminology, this information is useful for illustrating how the wealthy unequally contribute 
to green harms/crimes and injustice (Brisman and South 2014). As noted, ecological 
footprints vary across nations, and some nations produce more ecological 
destruction/disorganization than others through excessive consumption. A similar argument 
has also been made about social classes—the wealthy generate more ecological 
 23 
disorganization than other income groups due to conspicuous consumption. We addressed 
that issue estimating carbon dioxide outputs for SHs, SYs, luxury cars, and the private jet 
fleet in the United States.  
Conspicuous consumption is, as Thorsten Veblen argued, part of the nature of 
capitalism and the consumption habits capitalism generates. We extended this line of thought 
to suggest that the wealthy not only control production through ownership and management 
of the means of production, they also have a large ecological footprint that influences the 
course of ecological disorganization. In some cases, as illustrated above, their behaviors have 
ecological consequences as large as those produced by the populations of some nations. 
These results are not necessarily surprising, as one of the uses of accumulated wealth in a 
capitalist economy is consumption. These outcomes—both conspicuous consumption and the 
adverse ecological consequences such consumption generates—have been described as being 
part of the nature of capitalism (Foster 2000) and as one of its contradictions (Foster 1992). 
Ecological Marxists, however, have not been alone in pointing out this type of concern. 
Reviewing this issue, Hornborg (2009) identifies what he calls “the restricted number of 
critics of industrial capitalism,” which is illustrated in the development of the ecological 
economics literature (see Hornborg 2009:246–51; Martinez-Alier 1987). Those views, which 
include among others, emergy analysis, zero-sum growth arguments, steady-state economics, 
metabolic rift analysis, and ecological unequal exchange theory, all point toward the problem 
of ecological destruction and disorganization associated with capitalist production and 
consumption. Whether capitalism can be reorganized (e.g., steady-state economics) or must 
be replaced to solve the large-scale nature of the ecological crisis is, one can argue, an 
ideological question that depends on the initial assumption made in any of these approaches. 
Nevertheless, it can still be illustrated, as we have shown above, that the consumptive 
behaviors of the wealthy, who comprise a small part of the world’s population, has a much 
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more significant ecological impact than the behavior of other economic groups. Based on that 
observation, one could argue that it is necessary to devise strategies for controlling the 
conspicuous consumption habits of the wealthy. How that might be accomplished and 
assessing the economic effects of such restrictions is beyond the scope of this article.  
Theoretically, prior research within green criminology suggests that conspicuous 
consumption and the excessive ecological disorganization such consumption generates can be 
defined as a green crime—that is, as a crime against ecosystems and the inhabitants of 
ecosystems including nonhuman life forms, who suffer from those crimes as local and global 
ecosystems become increasingly disorganized (see also Agnew 2013; Lynch et al. 2013). 
Drawing upon ecological Marxism, Lynch et al. (2013) specially argue that in a political 
economic green criminological perspective, that “[a]s a result of the inherent contradiction 
between capitalism and nature, the capitalist system must be seen as a crime against nature” 
(p. 998). Outlawing capitalism is unlikely for a variety of reasons, including its global 
organizational scope, and the stored assets and various forms of political and military power 
that are routinely employed to prevent such a threat. Even at the local or national levels, the 
treadmill of environmental law or the organization of environmental laws is structured in 
ways that protect the capitalist treadmill of production and facilitate its expansion (Long et al. 
2018; Stretesky et al. 2013b), meaning that laws/regulations are an unlikely source for 
controlling conspicuous consumption. Legally, of course, conspicuous consumption is not a 
crime—it is an acceptable form of behavior encouraged under capitalism. But perhaps it 
should become a crime, given its adverse ecological impacts. More traditional analysts are 
likely to object to such a proposition, noting that these expenditures create jobs and allow 
wealth to “trickle down.” The effectiveness of trickle-down economic approaches is mixed at 
best, and even reports from the International Monetary Fund suggest this form of economics 
is not viable and often does not stand up to empirical scrutiny (Dabla-Norris et al. 2015).  
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In the modern context, the wealthy have a great many choices they can make as a result 
of their wealth. This often involves, as noted earlier, engaging in behaviors that Migone 
(2007) identifies as hedonistic consumption. Those behavioral choices, often freed from 
market constrains as a result of the level of economic resource availability the wealthy 
possess, can also generate extensive ecological harm. An increasing number of quantitative 
physical and social scientific studies indicate that the odds of local and global ecosystem 
collapse are expanding and that the continued expansion of production and consumption are 
part of the problem. Nations across the globe have been engaged in efforts to produce 
treaties, legislation, and regulations designed to curb production practices. While researchers 
also note the need to limit consumption as part of protective ecological policies (Meadows, 
Randers, and Meadows 2004; Schaefer and Crane 2005; Wapner and Willoughby 2005), no 
such policies about limiting consumption exist.  
Researchers in numerous fields can contribute to efforts to promote sustainability and 
limit the ecologically destructive consumption habits of the wealthy by developing and 
empirically assessing how such policies would promote ecological sustainability. Such 
studies are essential to developing a theoretically informed policy literature that explains the 
need for policies that limit excessive consumption as indispensable in an era where 
uncontrolled economic growth and expansion has outstripped ecological resource availability 
and ecological system sustainability.  
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